emy's Infantry were falling back to the woods which skirted the hill to the east and south. Only one of their batteries was holding its position.[1] It was evidently possible for the Federal troops to push forward and seize the hill, but Its eastern and southern borders were wooded, and these woods might, of course, be occupied by the enemy, in what force it was obviously impossible to determine. Still, there were no considerable bodies of them to be seen, and McDowell knew that those of their troops which had been driven from their position north of the turnpike had been very badly cut up and demoralized.

McDowell ordered a general advance. He did not undertake to co-ordinate the movements of his divisions and brigades as lie doubtless would have liked to do, because he thought it very doubtful if lie could succeed in such an undertaking with raw troops and inexperienced generals, and because moreover it would have taken precious time to make the attempt. He was also perfectly aware that his brigadiers,—excellent officers as they were,—would not be able to handle their new commands as they ought to be handled. For these defects of organization and this lack of experience there was, however, no present remedy. There was in truth every reason for

decisive action. Any hesitation on McDowell's part wua certain to damp the confidence of his men.

Knowing well, as he did, the moral support which the near presence of field artillery always gives to infantry, and especially to untried infantry, Me-

[1] Imboden's Staunion Artillery; i B. & L., 234. This was just before Jackson arrived with his brigade.